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Abstract
Over the years, U.S. banks have increasingly relied on the bond market to ﬁnance their
business. This created the potential for a link between the bond market and the corpo-
rate sector whereby borrowers, including those that do not rely on bond funding, became
exposed to the conditions in the bond market. We investigate the importance of this link.
Our results show that when the cost to access the bond market goes up, banks that rely on
bond ﬁnancing charge higher interest rates on their loans. Banks that rely exclusively on
deposit funding follow bond ﬁnancing banks and increase the interest rates on their loans,
though by smaller amounts. Further, banks pass the bond market shocks predominantly
to their risky borrowers that have access to the bond market and to their borrowers that
do not have access to the bond market. These results show that banks propagate shocks to
the bond market by passing them through their loan policies to their borrowers, including
those that do not use bond ﬁnancing.1 Introduction
Traditionally banks have funded their business with deposits. This made it easier for them to
shield corporate borrowers from shocks to the debt markets. Increasingly, however, banks are
relying on the bond market to ﬁnance their business. This has the potential of making bank
borrowers, including those that do not rely on bond funding, exposed to the conditions in the
bond market. In this paper, we seek evidence of this role of banks as propagators of bond
market shocks onto the corporate sector.
In a Modigliani and Miller world with complete markets and no information frictions,
the two sides of a ﬁrm’s balance sheet, including those of a bank, are independent. Absent
these conditions, such separation no longer holds and the capital structure of banks will likely
aﬀect their loan policy. Consistent with this thesis, Berlin and Mester (1999) report that banks
with more core deposits smooth loan interest rates in response to adverse economic shocks,
a ﬁnding which the authors argue is feasible because core deposits are largely interest rate
inelastic.1 Mester, Nakamura and Renault (1998) document that checking accounts provide
information about borrowing ﬁrms’ transactions, which in turn provide information about the
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial condition thereby inﬂuencing banks’ lending policies. More recently, Kuttner,
and Palia (2002), Steﬀen and Wahrenburg (2008) and Santos and Winton (2009) show that
bank capital plays a role in banks’ lending policy. These studies report that banks with
low capital charge higher rates, particularly to borrowers that are bank dependent, a ﬁnding
consistent with Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor’s (1993) theory of bank capital.2 Santos and
Winton (2009), in addition, ﬁnd that banks with low level of capital charge higher spreads
for borrowers with low cash ﬂow but oﬀer bigger discounts to borrowers with high cash ﬂow,
a result which supports Diamond and Rajan’s (2000) theory of bank capital.3 In this paper,
we add to this literature by investigating the potential eﬀect on banks’ loan pricing policies of
another component of banks’ capital structure, bond ﬁnancing.
Banks rely increasingly on the bond market to fund their business. At the end of 1988,
1Berger and Udell (1992) document that bank loan rates move in a smoother fashion than the market interest
rate, but they interpret this ﬁnding as evidence of implicit risk sharing agreements.
2According to Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor’s (1993) theory of bank capital, banks with low capital are likely
to sacriﬁce reputational capital by reneging on implicit guarantees to improve their ﬁnancial capital position.
Since one of banks’ implicit guarantees is the commitment not to exploit their monopoly power over borrowers,
those banks are likely to charge higher rates on their dependent borrowers.
3According to Diamond and Rajan’s (2000) theory of bank capital, banks with low capital are very focused
on obtaining cash ﬂow quickly to improve their capital stance. As a result, banks with low capital will charge
more to borrowers with low cash ﬂow and give big discounts to borrowers with high cash ﬂow in order to raise
their capital standards.
1the ﬁrst year of our sample, the share of bond ﬁnancing relative to deposit funding was 3.5%
among the top 100 U.S. banks. By the end of 2007, the last year of our sample, that share
had gone up to 9%. Banks’ use of bond ﬁnancing can have implications that go far beyond the
disciplining role that bondholders may exercise on banks.4 In particular, it may create a link
between the bond market and the corporate sector since shocks to the bond market may now
get propagated to the corporate sector via banks’ loan pricing policies. This link is important
because it exposes corporate borrowers, including those that do not rely on bond ﬁnancing, to
the conditions in the bond market. We attempt to detect evidence of that link in this paper
and to identify which corporate borrowers have become more exposed to shocks to the bond
market as a result of it.
We hypothesize that banks that rely on bond ﬁnancing adjust their loan pricing policies
in response to changes in the cost to issue in the bond market. Speciﬁcally, we hypothesize that
when the cost to issue in the bond market goes up, banks that use bond ﬁnancing increase
the interest rates on their corporate loans. Building on the theories of Sharpe (1990) and
Rajan (1992) on bank information monopoly, we further hypothesize that on these occasions
banks will increase interest rates for bank-dependent borrowers that do not have access to the
bond market. Since there is less information available about these borrowers, if they seek to
switch to a new funding source they will be pegged as lemons regardless of their true ﬁnancial
condition. As a result, banks that rely on bond ﬁnancing will try to pass on to these borrowers
the cost increase arising from their exposure to the bond market.5 Regarding borrowers that
have access to the bond market, since there is more information available about them, banks
will likely ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to hold them up and pass on to them part of that additional
cost of funding. On the other hand, since on these occasions the alternative funding source
that these borrowers have access to — bond ﬁnancing — is also more expensive, banks may
take advantage of this to increase interest rates on loans to these borrowers as well.6 In that
case, among the borrowers that do not depend on bank ﬁnancing exclusively, those that are
risky are more likely to see the interest rates on their bank loans go up because the cost they
4Research on banks’ use of bond funding has focused almost exclusively on the potential disciplining role
it may have on banks by investigating whether the credit spreads on bank bonds vary with their risk. Avery,
Belton and Goldberg (1988) and Gorton and Santomero (1990), ﬁnd that credit spreads on bank subordinated
debentures were virtually unrelated to traditional accounting measures of bank risk, but subsequent studies,
including Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Sironi (2003), ﬁnd a relationship between the credit spreads on bank
subordinated debentures and risk.
5For evidence in support of the hypothesis that banks price their informational monopoly see Santos and
Winton (2008), Hale and Santos (2008) and Schenone (2009).
6For evidence on the impact of the state of the economy on ex ante bond credit spreads, see Santos (2006),
Bernanke (1993), and Fama and French (1989).
2pay to access the bond market tends to increase by more in periods when there are shocks to
the bond market.
Banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding are not exposed to the conditions in the
bond market. As a result, they do not have the pressure to adjust their loan pricing policy in
response to an increase in the cost of bond ﬁnancing. In fact, these banks could take advantage
of these occasions and attempt to attract some borrowers from the former banks, in particular
those borrowers for which more information is available and thus which have lower switching
costs, by oﬀering them loans under better terms than their incumbent banks. On the other
hand, because those banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding are overwhelmingly smaller
institutions, they may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to compete with larger banks and may instead choose
to follow bond ﬁnancing banks and increase the interest rates on their corporate loans when it
becomes more expensive to raise funding in the bond market. In this case, however, we would
expect them to increase the interest rates on their loans by less or at most by the same amount
as the bond funding banks.
To test these hypotheses, we start by investigating whether banks’ loan pricing policies
vary with the cost of access to the bond market as determined by the primary yield on triple-B
rated bonds over the primary yield on triple-A rated bonds.7 We proceed by investigating
whether banks propagate shocks to the cost of access to the bond market to all of their
corporate borrowers. We are particularly interested in ﬁnding out whether borrowers that do
not rely on bond ﬁnancing are nonetheless exposed to the conditions in the bond market via
their banks.
Our results show that, other things being equal, banks that use bond ﬁnancing on
average charge about 25 basis points less on their loans than banks that rely exclusively on
deposit ﬁnancing. Our results also show that when the cost to access the bond market goes
up, banks that rely on bond ﬁnancing increase interest rates on their loans. When that
happens, these banks increase interest rates on their loans to borrowers that themselves use
bond ﬁnancing, in particular those that are riskier. They also increase interest rates on their
loans to borrowers that do not use bond ﬁnancing and are therefore likely dependent on banks
for funding.
We further ﬁnd that when the cost to access the bond market goes up, smaller banks
that rely exclusively on deposit funding follow banks that are directly exposed to bond market
conditions and increase the interest rates on their loans, though by smaller amounts. We
7We proxy the cost of access to the bond market by the primary yield spread of triple-B rated bonds
over triple-A bonds because all banks are rated investment grade. Further, the indexes on the yields of below
investment grade bonds go back only to February 1990 while those on investment grade rated bonds are available
for our entire sample period.
3do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the interest rate increases between bank-dependent and
non-bank-dependent borrowers of deposit funding banks.
Our analysis relies on some assumptions. One assumption is that the triple-B primary
yield spread captures the additional cost that banks with bond ﬁnancing incur when there
are shocks to the bond market. While this spread is correlated with the cost to issue in the
bond market, a potential concern is that this spread may also reﬂect changes in the overall risk
premium in the economy, in which case the eﬀect of the triple-B spread on banks’ loan pricing
could reﬂect instead an increase in banks’ overall cost of funds. To separate these eﬀects, we
control in our models for the cost of deposit funding as proxied by the product between the
share of deposit funding used by the bank and the 3-month LIBOR rate.8 In addition, we
investigate the robustness of our ﬁndings when we control for other variables that tend to
respond to changes in the risk premium demanded by investors, including the Treasury yield
spread, the level of LIBOR and the growth rate of the GDP. Under these conditions, we feel
conﬁdent that our triple-B yield spread proxies for the additional cost of bond ﬁnancing.
Another assumption is that when spreads in the bond market go up this increases
the cost of funds for banks that have bond ﬁnancing on their balance sheets. Since bonds
are ﬁxed rate securities, this implicitly assumes that these banks issue frequently in the bond
market and that it is costly for them to delay new issues in order to avoid periods of high bond
spreads. To reduce concerns with this assumption, we investigate the loan pricing policies of
banks that did issue in the bond market during periods of high bond spreads. The results of
this investigation conﬁrm that banks that rely on bond ﬁnancing do propagate shocks to the
corporate sector via their loan pricing policies.
Yet another assumption of our analysis is that banks as well as ﬁrms access to public
bond markets is exogenous. In reality, such access is likely to be endogenous, depending on
bank- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, respectively. To reduce concerns with this endogeneity on
the ﬁrm side, we reestimate our core models with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. In addition, we follow
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and reestimate our models using a two-step procedure. First,
we regress bond market access on a number of exogenous variables including several instru-
mental variables that proxy for how well known the ﬁrm is. We repeat similar procedure for
the bank access to the bond market. We then substitute the predicted value of market access
into our loan spread regression. Our results hold without substantial change.
Our paper is close to Berlin and Mester (1999) and in our view it complements their
8We cannot use banks’ interest expenses to proxy for the cost of deposit funding since these expenses also
include the interest banks pay on their bond ﬁnancing. While some banks report interest expenses on deposits
directly, only a small subsample of banks do so, making it infeasible to use this variable in our analysis.
4work in many important respects.9 Berlin and Mester focus on a period, the 1970s and the
1980s, where banks funded themselves almost entirely with deposits. We focus on the subse-
quent decades, when banks started to use bond ﬁnancing to complement their deposit funding.
Berlin and Mester’s key ﬁnding is that banks’ use of deposit funding makes it possible for them
to shield borrowers from economywide shocks because deposits are largely interest inelastic.
Our investigation shows that banks’ use of bond ﬁnancing makes their borrowers, including
those that rely exclusively on bank funding, exposed to shocks to the bond market. Since banks
are increasingly relying on bond ﬁnancing, our ﬁnding suggests that it will be increasingly more
diﬃcult for banks to shield their borrowers from economywide shocks. Lastly, like Berlin and
Mester we have detailed information about bank lenders and their loans.10 In contrast to them,
we have information on the identity of borrowers, which gives us the opportunity to control
for ﬁrm speciﬁc factors known to explain loan interest rates and to distinguish whether the
borrower is likely to be bank dependent or not.
Our ﬁndings are important not only because banks are increasingly relying on bond
ﬁnancing, but also because they show that as a result banks will ﬁnd it increasingly diﬃcult to
shield their borrowers from shocks to debt markets and by extension to promote relationship
lending, which remains a distinctive feature of banks.11 Our ﬁndings are also important because
they show that policies which aim at promoting market discipline have eﬀects that will go far
beyond the monitoring of banks by investors. Lastly, our ﬁndings show a new mechanism
that interlinks the ﬁnancial intermediation done through banks with the intermediation done
through the debt market. A common view in the ﬁnancial architecture literature is that banks
and debt markets operate independently from each other.12 Holmstrom and Tirole (1997),
9Our paper is also related to the bank lending channel literature, including Kashayap, Stein and Wilcox
(1993), Peek and Rosengren (1997), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Paravisni (2006) and Khwaja and Mian (2008).
This literature focuses on the lending eﬀects of shocks to bank liquidity. Our focus instead is on the lending
eﬀects of shocks to the bond market. Further, we attempt to identify these eﬀects by investigating banks’ loan
pricing policies rather than through the volume of loans they extend as is common in that literature.
10Our loan data source is Dealscan. This database has some nonsyndicated loans, but is only comprehensive
for loans which banks syndicate. Berlin and Mester rely instead on the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending to
Business. This database reports information on every business loan but only for a stratiﬁed sample of about
340 banks and for the loans banks made on a particular day (or number of days).
11Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that provided banks have some monopoly power in the loan market, they
are able to do intertemporal interest rate smoothing to their relationship borrowers. In their setting banks are
solely funded with deposits. If they used bond ﬁnancing in addition, it is easy to see that shocks to their cost
of bond ﬁnancing would hinder their ability to smooth interest rates, notwithstanding their monopoly power in
the loan market. See Boot (2000) for a review of the beneﬁts of relationship lending.
12See Allen and Gale (1997, 1999), Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and
Boot and Thakor (1997).
5Allen and Gale (2000), and Song and Thakor (2009) develop models in which banks and
ﬁnancial markets complement each other, but none of them consider the complementarity that
we identify in this paper. In Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), the complementarity arises because
access to bank funding allows some borrowers to tap debt markets for additional funding. In
Allen and Gale (2000), intermediaries provide individuals with insurance against unforeseen
contingencies in some states of nature, thereby eliminating the need for individuals to acquire
costly information. Analysis in Song and Thakor (2009) is the closest to the complementarity
we identify but in their setting banks rely on the equity market, not the bond market, to raise
the equity capital they need for regulatory reasons.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our
methodology and data, and characterizes our sample. Section 3 investigates whether the
interest rates banks charge their borrowers vary with banks’ use of bond ﬁnancing and with
cost to access the bond market. Section 4 investigates whether banks pass on the shocks to
the bond market to all corporate borrowers. Section 5 reports the results of our robustness
tests. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Methodology, data, and sample characterization
2.1 Methodology
Our methodology has two parts. Part I investigates whether the interest rates banks charge
on their corporate loans vary with banks’ use of bond ﬁnancing and with the conditions in the
bond market at the time of the loan. Part II investigates whether banks pass the shocks to
the cost they incur to raise bond ﬁnancing to all of their corporate borrowers, including those
that do not have access to the bond market.
2.1.1 Loan interest rates and banks’ access to debt markets
We start by investigating whether the interest rates banks charge on their corporate loans vary
across banks, depending on whether they rely on bond ﬁnancing, and with the conditions in
the bond market at the time of the loan. We are particularly interested in ﬁnding out whether
banks, including those that do not rely on bond ﬁnancing, account for the conditions in the
bond market when they extend loans to corporate borrowers. To this end, we estimate the
following model of loan spreads:
6LLOANSPDb,f,l,t = c + α SUBDEBTb,t−1 + β LBBBSPDt











where LLOANSPDb,f,l,t is the natural log of the all-in-drawn spread over LIBOR of loan l
extended by bank b to ﬁrm f at date t. According to Dealscan, our source of loan data, the
all-in-drawn spread is a measure of the overall cost of the loan, expressed as a spread over the
benchmark LIBOR, because it takes into account both one-time and recurring fees associated
with the loan.
SUBDEBTb,t−1 is a dummy variable indicating whether bank b has subdebt in its
balance sheet at time t − 1. This is our proxy for a bank’s reliance on bond funding. Since
SUBDEBT does not take into account when banks issued their bonds, in Section 5, we inves-
tigate what happens to our ﬁndings when we account for the timing of banks’ bond issuance
activity. Besides being an indicator of bank access to public debt markets, SUBDEBT may
also capture an eﬀect related to bank capital since subdebt may act (within certain limits)
as a substitute for bank equity capital. Bond ﬁnancing is likely more expensive that deposit
funding because it does not beneﬁt from deposit insurance. On the other hand, subdebt is
likely less expensive than bank capital. Thus the eﬀect of subdebt on loan spreads, measured
by α, could be either positive or negative.
LBBBSPDt is the natural log of the spread between triple-B and triple-A primary
yields on new bonds issued at time t. This is our proxy for the cost to access the bond market
at time t. This spread tends to increase in times when it is harder to access the bond market.
The coeﬃcient on this variable, β, measures the elasticity of loan spreads with respect to the
cost of access the bond market.
We hypothesize that when the cost to access the bond market increases, banks that rely
on the bond market to fund their business will pass on to their borrowers part of the additional
funding cost they incur. As a result, we expect 0 <γ+ β≤ < 1 with γ>0. On these
occasions, banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding may choose not to alter their loan
pricing policies in an attempt to attract some borrowers of the former banks. Alternatively,
since these banks are usually smaller, they may choose to follow bond ﬁnancing banks and also
increase the interest rates on their loans. In other words, we expect β≥0. We estimate these
eﬀects controlling for a set of bank-, ﬁrm-, and loan-speciﬁc variables, Bi,b,t−1,F j,f,t−1, and
Lk,l,t, which we describe next.
We ﬁrst discuss the set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables that we use. A subset of these vari-
ables, which includes LAGE, the log of the ﬁrm’s age in years (we compute the ﬁrm’s age by
7subtracting the date the ﬁrm ﬁrst appeared in Compustat from the date of each observation
in the sample), and LSALES, the log of the ﬁrm’s sales in hundreds of millions of dollars,
control for the ﬁrm’s overall risk. Older ﬁrms are typically better established and so less risky.
Similarly, larger ﬁrms are usually better diversiﬁed across customers, suppliers, and regions.
The next subset controls for the risk of the ﬁrm’s debt. It includes the ﬁrm’s proﬁt mar-
gin, PROF MARGIN (net income divided by sales); interest coverage, INTEREST COV
(EBITDA divided by interest expense); the leverage ratio, LEV ERAGE (debt over assets);
and its earnings volatility, EARNINGS V OL (the standard deviation of the ﬁrm’s quarterly
return on assets over the last three years). More proﬁtable ﬁrms as well as ﬁrms with higher
interest coverage have a greater cushion for servicing debt and so should pay lower spreads on
their loans. In contrast, ﬁrms with higher leverage and those with higher earnings volatility
will likely have a higher probability of default and so should pay higher spreads on their loans.
Our next set of variables attempts to control for another aspect of credit risk — the
losses that debt holders incur in the event of default. To capture this, we consider several
variables that measure the size and quality of the asset base that debt holders can draw
on in default, including the ﬁrm’s tangible assets, TANGIBLES (inventories plus plant,
property, and equipment over assets), its advertising expenses, ADVERTISING (advertising
expense divided by sales), and its expenses with research and development, R&D (research
and development expense divided by sales).13 Tangible assets lose less of their value in default
than do intangible assets, so we expect this variable to have a negative eﬀect on spreads. In
contrast, advertising expenses and R&D expenses, which proxy for the ﬁrm’s brand equity
and intellectual capital, respectively, are intangible, and so we also expect them to have a
positive eﬀect on spreads. We also control for the value the ﬁrm is expected to gain by future
growth, MKTTOBOOK (ﬁrm’s market to book ratio), and the ﬁrm’s net working capital,
NWC (current assets less current liabilities over debt).14 Although growth opportunities are
vulnerable to ﬁnancial distress, we already control for the portion of the ﬁrm’s assets that are
tangible. Thus, this variable could have a negative eﬀect on spreads if it represents additional
value (over and above book value) that debt holders can in part access in the event of default.
With regards to NWC, since the ﬁrm’s liquid asset base is less likely to lose value in default,
we expect this variable to have a negative eﬀect on spreads.
We complement this set of ﬁrm controls with RELATIONSHIP, which is a dummy
13Firms are required to report expenses with advertising only when they exceed a certain value. For this
reason, this variable is sometimes missing in Compustat. The same is true of expenses with research and
development. In either case, when the variable is missing we set it equal to zero.
14For ﬁrms with no debt, this variable is set equal to the diﬀerence between current assets and current
liabilities.
8variable equal to one if the ﬁrm borrowed from the same lead arranger in the three years prior
to the current loan. A relationship may give the ﬁrm the beneﬁt of a lower spread, but it may
also indicate greater information monopoly, leading to higher spreads.15 In addition, we include
dummy variables for single digit SIC industry groups since each industry may face additional
risk factors that are not captured by our controls, and include a time trend, TREND, to
account for a potential secular trend in loan interest rates.
The next set of variables controls for aspects related to the loan that are likely to aﬀect
loan spreads. It includes the log of loan amount in dollars, LAMOUNT; and the log of the
loan maturity in years, LMATURITY. Larger loans may represent more credit risk, but they
may also allow economies of scale in processing and monitoring the loan. Similarly, loans with
longer maturities may face greater credit risk, but they are more likely to be granted to ﬁrms
that are thought to be more creditworthy. So, the eﬀects of these variables on the spread is
ambiguous. This set also includes dummy variables equal to one if the loan has restrictions on
paying dividends (DIVIDEND REST), is senior (SENIOR), or is secured (SECURED).
All else equal, any of these features should make the loan safer, decreasing the spread, but it
is well known that lenders are more likely to require these features if they think the ﬁrm is
riskier (Berger and Udell, 1990), so the relationship may be reversed. Because the purpose
of the loan is likely to aﬀect its credit spread, we include dummy variables for loans taken
out for corporate purposes (CORP PURPOSES), to reﬁnance a loan (REFINANCE), and
for working capital purposes (WORKCAPITAL). Similarly, we include dummy variables to
account for the type of the loan, in particular for lines of credit (CREDIT LINE) and for
term loans (TERM LOAN). Since loan controls can be jointly determined with loan spreads,
we estimate our models both with and without the set of loan controls.
Our ﬁnal set of variables controls for aspects related to banks that are also likely to play
a role in their loan pricing policies. LASSETS, the log of the bank’s total assets in hundreds
of millions of dollars, controls for bank size. Larger banks are likely to be better diversiﬁed or
to have access to funding under better terms giving them the opportunity to charge lower loan
spreads. If safer banks are able to access funding under better terms, then we also expect other
measures of bank risk, such as the return on assets, ROA, the volatility of return on assets,
ROAVOL, and net loan charge-oﬀs as a fraction of assets, CHARGEOFFS, to be correlated
with the interest rates banks charge on their corporate loans.16 For the same reason we expect
15Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2008) ﬁnd that the impact of a relationship on spreads is
negative; however, Santos and Winton (2008) ﬁnd that this eﬀect is reversed in recessions, when information
monopolies are likely to be stronger and maintaining relationships is likely to be less attractive to lenders.
16We use the volatility of ROA rather than stock return because a large number of the banks in the sample
do not have publicly traded shares.
9the bank’s capital-to-assets ratio, CAPITAL, to be negatively related to loan interest rates.
This relationship may also arise because, according to Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1993),
banks with low capital are more willing to consume reputational capital to build up ﬁnancial
capital and thus are more likely to renege on implicit guarantees, including the guarantee not
to explore their informational monopoly. In addition, we include the bank’s holdings of cash
and marketable securities as a fraction of total assets, LIQUIDITY, because banks with more
liquid assets may ﬁnd it easier to fund loans on the margin, again leading to lower loan spreads.
Lastly, to reduce concerns that the proxy we use to capture the cost to raise funding in the
bond market, BBBSPD, may also pick up changes in the cost of bank deposits, we control
for the cost of deposit funding, DEPOSIT COST, as proxied by the product of the bank’s
deposit-to-asset ratio with LIBOR.17
2.1.2 Are all borrowers exposed to the cost of banks’ bond funding?
In the second part of our methodology, we investigate whether banks pass the bond market
shocks to all of their borrowers. We are particularly interested in learning whether bank-
dependent borrowers, that is borrowers that do not have access to the bond market, are exposed
to these shocks. We are also interested in ﬁnding out whether borrowers with access to the
bond market are exposed to those shocks. These borrowers tend not to be bank dependent in
good times, but they may become dependent on banks for funding when the conditions in the
bond market deteriorate, in which case they may also become exposed to shocks to the bank’s
bond funding costs.
To investigate these issues, we distinguish bank-dependent borrowers from borrowers
that have access to the bond market. Our loan pricing model already distinguishes between
banks that use bond ﬁnancing and those that rely exclusively on deposit funding, and it
attempts to compare how each of these banks react to changes in the cost of bond ﬁnancing.
Thus, to avoid adding a third level of interaction terms in order to account for diﬀerent types
of borrowers, we opted for estimating the following modiﬁed version of our loan pricing model
separately for the two types of banks in our sample: those with subordinated debt and those
without.
17Call report data contain information on banks’ total interest expenses. They also contain separate in-
formation on interest expenses related to deposit ﬁnancing and interest expenses related to subdebt, but the
information on these costs is missing for a signiﬁcant number of observations in our sample. In Section 5 we
discuss what happens to our key ﬁndings when we control for the cost of deposit funding by the interest expenses
banks incur with their deposits.
10LLOANSPDb,f,l,t = c + η MACCESSf,t−1 + β LBBBSPDt











where LLOANSPDb,f,l,t and BBBSPDt are as deﬁned in part I above.
MACCESSf,t−1 is our proxy for borrowers’ access to the bond market. Firms with
access to the public bond market are less likely to be bank-dependent. These ﬁrms can tap
a large number of reasonably well informed investors. In addition, there is more information
available on them. There is information on these ﬁrms which arises from their ﬁlings to register
bonds, information that their underwriters disclose in their eﬀort to place bonds with investors,
information from bond spreads and bond analysts, and from the credit ratings assigned by
rating agencies. This reduces the extent to which lenders can hold-up these ﬁrms for higher
interest rates ´ a la Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992). Thus, we expect to have η<0 and β>0
with β + γ≥0 for borrowers that take out loans from bond ﬁnancing banks. For borrowers
that take out loans from banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding we also expect to have
η<0 for the same reasons. However, in this case, we expect to ﬁnd a smaller eﬀect or even
no eﬀect of the cost to access the bond market, LBBBSPD, on the spreads these borrowers
pay on their loans. In other words, β>0 and γ are less likely to be signiﬁcant in the sample
of loans extended by deposit funding banks.
We consider two alternative approaches to determine whether a borrower has access to
the bond market. Under the ﬁrst approach, we assume that if a borrower has a credit rating
at the time of the loan then it has access to the bond market. This assumption follows the
evidence that ﬁrms usually need to have a credit rating to issue in the public bond market.
A potential problem with this deﬁnition of non-bank-dependent ﬁrms, however, is that some
of the ﬁrms with a credit rating may have never issued in the public bond market or did it
only a long time ago. Since these ﬁrms are more likely to be dependent on banks than rated
ﬁrms that issued in that market recently under our second approach, we distinguish bank-
dependent borrowers from nondependent borrowers by whether they have issued in the public
bond market in the recent past (for the purpose of our tests we deﬁne the recent past as the
ﬁve-year period prior to the loan).18
18We do not count privately placed bonds as a measure of public bond market access. We believe private
placements are very diﬀerent from public issues, reaching a smaller set of investors and thus not increasing
informed competition as much as a public issue does. As a practical matter, there is far less information on
private placements because the SEC ﬁling rules on public issues do not apply to private issues. This makes
11Since according to Rajan (1992) the holdup problem is more acute for risky ﬁrms than
safe ﬁrms, we further distinguish among the ﬁrms that have access to the bond market those
that are rated investment grade from those that are rated below investment grade. When we
classify ﬁrms as bank dependent or not according to whether they have a credit rating, we
use the rating of the ﬁrm to determine if they are rated investment grade or below investment
grade at the time of the loan. When we classify ﬁrms as bank dependent or not according to
whether they have issued at least once in the public bond market in the ﬁve years prior to the
loan, we use the rating of the ﬁrm’s most recent public bond (prior to the loan) to determine
whether it is rated investment grade or below investment grade.
As in part I, we estimate whether banks pass the shocks to the bond market diﬀerently
to bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent borrowers, controlling for the set of bank-, ﬁrm-,
and loan-speciﬁc characteristics, Bi,b,t−1,F j,f,t−1, and Lk,l,t. Further, since loan controls can
be jointly determined with loan spreads, as in part I, we estimate our models both with and
without the set of loan controls.
2.2 Data
The data for this project come from several data sources, including the Loan Pricing Cor-
poration’s Dealscan database (LPC), the Securities Data Corporation’s Domestic New Bond
Issuances database (SDC), the Center for Research on Securities Prices’s stock prices database
(CRSP), the Salomon Brother’s bond yields indices, Compustat, and from the Federal Re-
serve’s Call Reports.
We use LPC’s Dealscan database of business loans to identify the ﬁrms that borrowed
from banks and when they did so. Most but not all of the loans in this database are syndicated.
It goes as far back as the beginning of the 1980s. In the ﬁrst part of that decade the database
has a somewhat limited number of entries but its comprehensiveness has increased steadily over
time, which is why we begin our sample in 1987. Our sample ends in December 2007. We also
use the Dealscan database to obtain the following information: individual loan characteristics,
including the loan’s spread over LIBOR, maturity, seniority status, purpose and type; borrower
characteristics, including its sector of activity and its legal status (private or public ﬁrm); and
ﬁnally, the identity and role of the banks in the syndicate.
We rely on SDC’s Domestic New Bond Issuances database to identify which ﬁrms
in our sample issued bonds prior to borrowing in the syndicated loan market and to gather
information on banks’ bond issuance activity. This database contains information on the bonds
issued in the United States by American corporations since 1970. We also rely on this database
it hard to control for ﬁrms’ private placements. This is consistent with earlier work that considers private
placements to be closer to syndicated bank loans than to public bonds.
12to identify some features of the bonds issued by the ﬁrms in our sample, including issuance
date, credit rating, and whether they were publicly placed.
We use Compustat to get information on ﬁrms’ balance sheets. Even though LPC
contains loans from both privately held and publicly listed ﬁrms, given that Compustat is
dominated by the latter, we have to exclude from our sample the loans borrowed by privately
held ﬁrms.
We rely on the CRSP database to link companies and subsidiaries that are part of the
same ﬁrm, and to link companies over time that went through mergers, acquisitions, or name
changes.19 We then use these links to merge the LPC, SDC and Compustat databases in order
to ﬁnd out the ﬁnancial condition of the ﬁrm at the time it borrowed from banks and if by
that date the ﬁrm had already issued bonds.
We use the Salomon Brothers yield indices on new industrial long-term bonds to control
for the conditions in the bond market at the time ﬁrms take out loans from banks. We consider
the indices on yields of triple-A and triple-B rated bonds because these go further back in time
than the indices on the investment grade and below investment grade bonds.
Finally, we use the Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) compiled by the
FDIC, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Reserve System to obtain bank-level
data for the lead bank(s) in each loan syndicate, including the bank’s capital-to-asset ratio, its
size, proﬁtability, risk, and information on whether it uses bond ﬁnancing.
2.3 Sample characterization
Table 1 characterizes our sample of 19930 loans. These loans are extended by 381 banks over
the years 1987-2007 to 4222 borrowers. The top panel compares the 205 banks that had bond
ﬁnancing at the time of their loans with the 251 banks that had only deposit ﬁnancing at
the time of their loans.20 The middle panel compares the 18033 loans in the sample that the
former banks extended with the 1897 loans extended by banks that rely exclusively on deposit
funding. Finally, the bottom panel of the table compares the borrowers of these two sets of
loans.
Looking at the top panel, it is apparent that, compared to banks that rely exclusively
19The process we used to link LPC, SDC, and Compustat can be summarized as follows. The CRSP data
was ﬁrst used to obtain, through name-matching procedure, CUSIPs for the companies in LPC for which this
information was missing. With a CUSIP, LPC could then be linked to both SDC and Compustat, which are
CUSIP-based data sets. We proceed by using the PERMCO variable from CRSP to group companies across
CUSIPs, since that variable tracks the same company across CUSIPs and ticker changes.
20The number of banks adds up to more than the total number because some banks switch from using bond
ﬁnancing to deposit ﬁnancing alone (or vice versa) over the sample period.
13on deposit funding, banks that use bond ﬁnancing are larger, hold less liquidity, operate with
a lower deposit-to-asset ratio, and spend less on deposit funding according to the two proxies
we consider for the cost of this funding source, DEPOSITCOST and INTEXPENSE.21
Despite these diﬀerences, bond ﬁnancing banks appear to be less proﬁtable since they have a
lower ROA. Further, these banks may not be safer. Their ROA is less volatile, but they have a
lower capital-to-asset ratio (CAPITAL), and higher charge-oﬀs (CHARGEOFFSS), though
in the latter case the diﬀerence with deposit funding banks is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In the middle panel of the table we see that bond ﬁnancing banks charge on average
72 basis points less on their loans than banks that rely exclusively on deposit ﬁnancing. This
diﬀerence may be because former banks extend signiﬁcantly larger loans or because they are
more likely to extend loans to relationship borrowers. It may also arise because bond ﬁnancing
banks extend more loans to borrowers that are not bank dependent. As we can see from the
bottom panel of the table, a larger portion of the borrowers of those banks have a credit rating
and therefore are likely to have access to the bond market themselves. A larger portion of
the borrowers of bond ﬁnancing banks has also issued bonds in the public bond market in the
three years prior to the loan, conﬁrming that borrowers of these banks are less likely to be
bank dependent.
That diﬀerence in interest rates may also reﬂect a diﬀerence in the risk of these banks’
borrowers. Although in this case, as we can see from the bottom panel, the evidence appears to
be mixed. Compared to borrowers of deposit funding banks, borrowers of bond ﬁnancing banks
are on average older, larger, have better proﬁt margins and higher net working capital, and
have more growth opportunities. All of these features suggest that bond ﬁnancing banks tend
to extend loans to safer borrowers. However, there is also evidence that suggests otherwise.
For example, borrowers of bond ﬁnancing banks on average have lower interest coverage and
less tangible assets. Further, they have higher leverage ratios and their earnings are more
volatile.
Last, the diﬀerence in the interest rates that these banks charge on their loans to
corporate borrowers may reﬂect diﬀerences in their costs of funding, including their use of
bond ﬁnancing. As we noted above, bond ﬁnancing banks appear to be able to raise deposit
funding at lower interest rates. In addition, they can complement this funding source with
bond ﬁnancing.
In Table 2, we look more closely at the questions we pose in this paper. To ascertain
21As we noted above, since the information on interest expenses banks incur on their deposits,
INTEXPENSE,is missing for 6921 of the 19930 observations in our sample, we also proxy for banks’ expenses
with their deposits by DEPOSITCOST, which we compute as the product between the ratio of deposits over
assets and the three-month LIBOR.
14whether there is a link between banks’ loan pricing policies and their bond funding costs, we
compare in the top panel of the table the loan interest rates that deposit funding and bond
funding banks charge when the cost to access the bond market is low and high; meaning that
BBBSPD is in the lowest and highest quartiles of the distribution of this variable. Consistent
with our priors, the results show that when the conditions in the bond market deteriorate,
banks that rely on bond ﬁnancing increase the interest rates they charge on their loans by
38 bps. On those occasions banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding also increase their
loan interest rates by 53 bps. Contrary to our expectations, deposit funding banks appear to
react more to the increase in the cost of raising funds in the bond market than bond ﬁnancing
banks, though the diﬀerence between the increase in spreads by the two groups of banks is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
The bottom panel of Table 2 reports whether all borrowers are exposed to the shocks in
banks’ funding costs. To that end, we classify each borrower that does not have a credit rating
at the time of the loan to be bank dependent while those that have a credit rating are classiﬁed
as non-bank dependent. In line with our expectations, bank-dependent borrowers appear to
be more exposed to those shocks. Note though that borrowers that are not bank dependent
also suﬀer from an increase in interest rates, possibly because the alternative funding source
they have access to—bond ﬁnancing—also becomes more expensive on those occasions. Bank
dependent borrowers that take out loans from banks that rely on bond ﬁnancing on average
pay an additional 51 bps on their loans when the cost to access the bond market goes up. On
these occasions, non-bank dependent borrowers that take out loans from these banks pay only
an additional 44 bps on their loans. For banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding, we
ﬁnd a similar pattern: bank-dependent borrowers are forced to pay an additional 55 bps while
non-bank-dependent borrowers pay only an additional 42 bps. It is worth noting though that
on either occasion the diﬀerence in the increase in the loan interest rates of these groups of
borrowers is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In sum, the results of our sample characterization suggest that banks, including those
that rely exclusively on deposit funding, adjust their loan pricing policies in response to changes
in the cost to raise funding in the bond market. Our results also suggest that all borrowers
are exposed to these changes in bank policies. As a consequence, borrowers that do not rely
on the bond market become exposed to the conditions in the bond market. In other words,
it appears that banks by using the bond market to fund their business, expose all corporate
borrowers to the conditions in the bond market. In the rest of this paper, we look at this link
that banks create between the bond market and their corporate borrowers more closely, using
multivariate analysis.
153 Do banks pass bond market shocks on to borrowers?
We investigate in this section whether banks’ access to the bond market creates a link between
the cost to issue in that market and the interest rates banks charge on their corporate loans.
In the next section we investigate whether this link has a bigger eﬀect on borrowers that are
dependent on banks for external funding. We then proceed with a series of robustness tests to
our key results.
Table 3 reports the results of our tests of whether banks, including those that do not
rely on bond ﬁnancing, adjust their loan interest rates in response to changes in the cost to
access the bond market. Model 1 compares the loan pricing policies of banks that use bond
ﬁnancing with the policies of banks that fund their business solely with deposits, controlling for
our set of borrower-speciﬁc characteristics, F. Model 2 expands model 1 to investigate whether
these two sets of banks adjust their loan pricing policies diﬀerently in response to changes in
the cost to access the bond market as determined by the log of the yield spread of triple-B
over triple-A rated bonds, BBBBSPD. Models 3 and 4 investigate if the insights of model 2
continue to hold when further control for our sets of loan-speciﬁc, L, and bank-speciﬁc controls
B. Finally, model 5 further expands model 4 to account for the cost of deposit funding.
Looking at model 1, it is apparent that banks that rely on bond ﬁnancing extend loans
at lower interest rates. The coeﬃcient on the dummy variable we use to control whether the
bank uses bond ﬁnancing, SUBDEBT, is equal to -0.14 indicating that, on average, spreads
on loans extended by bond ﬁnancing banks are about 14 percent, or 24 basis points when
evaluated at sample mean, lower than on loans extended by banks that rely exclusively on
deposit funding. Model 2 shows that these savings go down when the cost to raise funding
in the bond market goes up. Since the coeﬃcient on SUBDEBT x LBBBSPD is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant, this indicates that bond ﬁnancing banks increase the spreads on
their loans when the cost to access the bond market goes up. Importantly, this model also
shows that when this happens, deposit ﬁnancing banks follow the former banks and increase
the interest rates on their loans, though by a smaller amount, as represented by a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on LBBBSPD. According to the estimates of model 2,
when the triple-B yield spread in the bond market doubles,22 deposit funding banks increase
their loan spreads by 10.2 percent (which, given the mean of loan spread of these banks of 234
basis points, corresponds to an increase of about 23.9 basis points), while it leads bond funding
banks to increase their loan spreads by 27.5 percent (which, given the mean loan spreads for
this group of banks of 162 basis points, corresponds to an increase of about 44.6 basis points).
22Historically, during crises in the U.S. bond market the triple-B yield spread has more than doubled (see
footnote (31) below for further details).
16The ﬁrm controls we use in models 1 and 2 are generally consistent with our discussion
in the methodology section. Older and larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms with more interest coverage,
tangibles and growth opportunities pay lower spreads on their loans. Firms that borrow from
relationship banks are also able to borrow at lower interest rates. In contrast, ﬁrms with higher
levels of leverage and more volatile earnings pay higher spreads on their loans. Contrary to
expectations, though, ﬁrms with more R&D expenses as well as those with more advertising
expenses (relative to their sales) are able to borrow at lower interest rates.
Models 3 and 4 show that the above ﬁndings continue to hold when we account for
loan controls and bank controls, respectively. Bond ﬁnancing banks increase the interest rates
on their corporate loans when the cost they incur to raise bond ﬁnancing goes up. When
that happens, deposit funding banks follow suit and increase interest rates on their loans,
though by a statistically signiﬁcantly smaller amount. Loan controls are consistent with our
expectations as discussed in the methodology section. Larger loans and senior loans pay lower
interest rates. In contrast, longer maturity loans carry higher interest rates. Similarly, secured
loans and loans that give rise to dividend constraints carry higher spreads. Even though these
covenants aim at protecting lenders, they are more often present in loans to riskier borrowers,
thereby explaining why loans with these covenants carry higher spreads. Finally, term loans
and credit lines carry lower spreads. Reﬁnance loans and loans for working capital pay higher
spreads. With respect to bank controls, our results conﬁrm that banks that incur larger losses
charge higher spreads on their loans while those with higher capital-to-asset ratios charge lower
spreads. None of the remaining bank controls are statistically signiﬁcant, but their signs are
generally consistent with expectations.23
Despite the large set of factors we account for with our controls, a potential concern
with our result that deposit funding banks follow bond ﬁnancing banks and adjust the interest
rates on their loans when the cost to access the bond market goes up is the possibility of a third
factor explaining this link. In particular, the set of bank controls we use in model 4 does not
account for a potentially important determinant of a bank’s cost of funds — the cost it incurs
to raise deposit funding. If this cost is strongly correlated with our proxy for the cost to access
the bond market, this could explain some of our ﬁndings.24 To investigate this possibility,
we expand our set of bank controls to account for the cost a bank incurs to raise deposit
23Bank size as measured by assets has a positive sign, which may be contrary to expectations, but the evidence
on scale economies in banking is mixed.
24It is unlikely to explain the entirety of our results because deposit funding banks rely more heavily on this
source of funding than bond ﬁnancing banks and yet they adjust their loan interest rates by less when the cost of
bond ﬁnancing goes up. Moreover, for the subsample of banks for which we have interest expenses on deposits,
the correlation between these expenses as a share of assets and triple-B spread is only 3.8 percent.
17funding. The results of this test, which are reported in model 5, show that the cost of deposit
funding increase loan interest rates though by an amount that is not statistically diﬀerent from
zero. More importantly, the results of model 5 conﬁrm our earlier ﬁndings: When it becomes
more expensive to raise bond ﬁnancing, banks that rely on this source of funding pass on part
of these additional costs to their corporate borrowers. On those occasions, deposit funding
banks, which are smaller and thus likely to follow the former banks, also choose to increase
the interest rates they charge their corporate borrowers, though by a smaller amount than the
former banks.
In sum, the ﬁndings we reported in this section show that banks propagate shocks to
the bond market to the corporate sector. According to our estimates the eﬀect of these shocks
on loans spreads is economically signiﬁcant. In times of crises in the bond market, it will lead
banks that rely on bond ﬁnancing to increase spreads on their loans in excess of 45 basis points.
Further, our ﬁndings indicate that deposit funding banks ‘follow” bond ﬁnancing banks and
increase interest rates on their loans on these occasions, though by a smaller amount (24 basis
points).
It is not clear though from the results we reported thus far whether banks expose
all borrowers to those shocks. It is possible that when the conditions in the bond market
deteriorate, banks increase interest rates on their loans only to borrowers that also happen
to use this funding source while shielding the remaining borrowers from these shocks. It is
also possible that banks pass that cost increase mostly on to the latter borrowers since they
are more dependent on banks for external funding. This diﬀerence is important because it
highlights the extent of banks’ propagation of the conditions in the bond market to their
corporate borrowers. We investigate this issue in the next section.
4 Do banks pass bond market shocks to all borrowers?
The tests we reported in the previous section distinguish between banks that do and those that
do not use bond ﬁnancing, but do not distinguish between bank borrowers that do and those
that do not rely on this funding source. Identifying these borrowers will help us understand
how bond ﬁnancing banks transfer the additional cost they incur when there are shocks to the
bond market. A reason is that borrowers that do not rely on bond ﬁnancing are more likely
to be bank dependent. As such, they are more vulnerable to banks’ needs to make up for the
additional cost they incur when it becomes more expensive to raise bond ﬁnancing. Borrowers
that have access to the bond market are less likely to be bank dependent and as a result are
less exposed to those pressures on banks. On the other hand, since these pressures arise from
an increase in the cost of bond ﬁnancing this will also increase the cost of the alternative source
18of funding available to these borrowers, thereby giving banks an opportunity to increase the
interest rates on their loans to them.
To investigate these possibilities, we estimate our loan pricing model separately for
banks that use bond ﬁnancing and those that rely exclusively on deposit funding. Further,
we expand this model to distinguish whether each borrower is bank dependent or not. As we
noted in the methodology section, we consider two alternative ways to identify bank-dependent
borrowers. Under the ﬁrst approach, we assume a borrower that does not have a credit rating
to be bank dependent. Since not all rated ﬁrms have access to the public bond market, either
because they never issued in this market or only did it a long time ago, under our second
approach we classify as bank dependent all borrowers that did not issue in the public bond
market recently (over the ﬁve years prior to the loan). Further, since according to Rajan (1992)
the holdup problem is more pronounced to risky ﬁrms than safe ﬁrms, we further distinguish
among the ﬁrms that have access to the bond market those that are rated investment grade
from those that are rated below investment grade. The results of these tests are reported in
Table 4. In the interest of space, we report only the coeﬃcients relevant for each test and the
coeﬃcients that show banks’ loan pricing response to shocks to the bond market. All models,
however, include our sets of ﬁrm-, loan-, and bank-speciﬁc controls as well as our control for
the cost of deposit funding as used in model 5 of Table 3.
Models 1 and 2 investigate how deposit funding and bond funding banks, respectively,
adjust their loan pricing policies in response to shocks to the bond market, without diﬀeren-
tiating between groups of borrowers. Consistent with our earlier ﬁndings, these models show
that both banks increase interest rates on their loans when the cost to access the bond market
goes up. Also consistent with our earlier ﬁndings, these models show that bond ﬁnancing banks
adjust their loan pricing policy by more than deposit funding banks in response to changes in
the cost to access the bond market. The elasticity of loan spreads to the triple-B yield spread
for loans extended by banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding is 0.11 (model 1 of Table
4). Among loans of bond ﬁnancing banks, this elasticity is 0.27 (model 2 of Table 4). It is
worth noting that these elasticities are very similar to the elasticities we reported in Table 3,
even though now we allow for the coeﬃcients on control variables to vary between the two
groups of banks.
Models 3 and 4 expand the previous models to distinguish between borrowers that have
a credit rating and those that do not. As with models 1 and 2, we continue to ﬁnd that banks
increase interest rates on their loans when the cost to access the bond market goes up and
that this eﬀect is larger for banks that use bond ﬁnancing. However, our results indicate that
while deposit funding banks apply a smaller interest rate increase to their non-bank-dependent
borrowers and to their dependent borrowers (though the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant), bond
19ﬁnancing banks apply a larger interest rate increase to their non-dependent borrowers than
to their dependent borrowers, and in the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. Among loans of
bond ﬁnancing banks, the loan-spread elasticity to the triple-B yield spread is 0.30 for loans
of borrowers with a credit rating and only 0.23 for loans of unrated borrowers.
Bond ﬁnancing banks may impose a larger interest rate premium on borrowers with
a credit rating than on unrated borrowers when the cost to access the bond market goes up
because on these occasions the former borrowers also become dependent on banks for funding.
An alternative explanation for this ﬁnding is that our proxy for non bank dependent borrowers
is too broad and includes also borrowers that are bank dependent. For instance, some borrowers
may have a credit rating but they may have not been to the bond market for quite some time.
These borrowers are more likely to be bank-dependent than say borrowers that have issued
recently in that market. To investigate this possibility, in models 5 and 6, we consider a
narrower deﬁnition of ﬁrms’ access to the bond market. We assume that a ﬁrm has access
to the bond market if it issued a public bond at least once in the ﬁve year period before the
loan. As in our earlier tests, we continue to ﬁnd that banks that rely exclusively on deposit
funding apply a smaller interest premium to their non-dependent than to their bank-dependent
borrowers, though the diﬀerence continues to be statistically insigniﬁcant. In contrast with our
previous ﬁndings, however, the new tests show that banks that rely on bond ﬁnancing increase
interest rates on their loans to bank-dependent borrowers by more than they do on their loans
to borrowers with access to the bond market. The loan spread elasticity to the triple-B bond
yield spread is 0.29 for bank-dependent borrowers and 0.23 for non-dependent borrowers. The
diﬀerence between these elasticities is statistically signiﬁcant as indicated by the signiﬁcance
of the interaction term in model 6.
These insights continue to hold when we further split borrowers with access to the
bond market into two groups: those that are safe (their most recent public bond issue prior
to the loan was rated investment grade) and those that are risky (their most recent public
bond issue was rated below investment grade). As we can see from these tests, which are
reported in models 7 and 8 of Table 4, there is one important diﬀerence vis-´ a-vis the previous
set of models — when the conditions in the bond market deteriorate, banks that rely on bond
ﬁnancing apply their largest increase on loan spreads to their risky borrowers that have access
to the bond market. Next in line come the borrowers that are bank-dependent, followed by
safe borrowers that have access to the bond market, though the diﬀerence between the last
two sets of borrowers is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
According to models 7 and 8, in periods of crisis in the bond market (the triple-B yield
spread more than doubles (see footnote (31) for further details), banks that rely exclusively
on deposit funding increase the loan spreads to their bank-dependent borrowers as well as
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triple-B yield spreads double). This increase corresponds to 25 basis points when computed
at the mean loan spread charged by these banks. As for banks that rely on bond ﬁnancing,
they increase the loan spreads to their bank-dependent borrowers and those borrowers that
issued investment grade bond by 27.5 percent (which corresponds to an increase of 45 basis
points when computed at the mean loan spread charged by these banks), while borrowers that
issued a bond rated below investment grade see their loans spreads go up by about 36.8 percent
(which corresponds to an increase of 60 basis points when computed at the mean loan spread
charged by these banks).
In sum, the results we unveiled in this section conﬁrm our earlier ﬁndings that both
banks that rely on bond ﬁnancing and those that use exclusively deposit funding increase their
loan spreads when the cost to access the bond market goes up, though the former banks impose
a larger interest rate premium possibly because their cost of funding goes up by more on these
occasions. The results of this section further show that banks do not pass this increase in their
cost of funding equally to all of their borrowers. On these occasions, banks that rely on bond
ﬁnancing, for instance, impose the largest interest premium on their risky borrowers that have
access to the bond market, possibly because these ﬁrms are often shut out of the bond market
when the conditions in the bond market deteriorate, making them eﬀectively dependent on
banks. Borrowers that do not have access to the bond market face the next largest interest
rate premium. Borrowers that have access to the bond market and are rated investment grade
are the least exposed to this interest rate premium. We do not ﬁnd the same diﬀerences among
borrowers of banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding. This could be because the vast
majority of these banks’ borrowers are bank dependent. It could also be because these banks
are not subject to the same increase in their cost of funding when spreads in the bond market
go up. On these occasions, they increase their loan spreads by less than bond ﬁnancing banks
and do it likely only to take advantage of the spread increase promoted by the latter banks,
which are probably the leaders of the banking industry.
These ﬁndings, if proven to be robust, are quite important. For instance, they show
a novel channel — the funding choices of banks — that connects bank funding and market
funding. Before we discuss some of the implications of these results, in the next section we
present the results of our robustness tests.
5 Robustness tests
We report in this section the results of our robustness tests. We begin with the robustness
tests to our ﬁndings on banks’ response to shocks to the bond market. This is followed by
21the robustness tests to our ﬁndings on how banks pass the shocks to the bond market to their
dependent borrowers and to their borrowers that have access to the bond market. We conclude
this section with an investigation of the loan policies of those banks that did issue during crises
periods in the bond market.
5.1 Do banks pass bond market shocks on to borrowers? Robustness tests
Our investigation into banks’ response to shocks to the bond market shows two important
ﬁndings: First, when it becomes more expensive to raise funding in the bond market, banks
that rely on this source of funding increase the interest rates on their corporate loans. Second,
on those occasions, banks that fund themselves exclusively with deposits also increased the
interest rates on their corporate loans though by a smaller amount than the former banks.
We report in Table 5 the robustness of these ﬁndings when we control for (a) an
alternative proxy for the cost of deposit funding, (b) the overall conditions in the economy
at the time of the loan, (c) the extent to which banks use bond ﬁnancing, (d) the potential
endogeneity of banks’ access to the bond market, and when we (e) cluster the standard errors
simultaneously by ﬁrm and by bank and (f) account for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. All tests use as a
benchmark model 5 of Table 3, which is our most comprehensive model of loan pricing. In the
interest of space, we report in that table only the coeﬃcients relevant for each test as well as
the coeﬃcients that show banks’ loan pricing response to shocks to the bond market.
5.1.1 Controlling for the cost of deposit funding
An important determinant of the cost banks pay to raise funding, and possibly of their loan
pricing policy, is the cost of deposit funding. As we saw above, when we control for the cost of
deposit, DEPOSIT COST, as proxied by the product of the bank’s deposit-to-asset ratio with
LIBOR, our results remain unchanged. As we also noted back then, contrary to expectations
the coeﬃcient on this variable while positive is not statistically signiﬁcant. This may arise
because our proxy for the cost of deposit funding does not reﬂect the cost banks incur to
raise deposit funding since it does not capture diﬀerences in the interest rates that each bank
pays on its deposits. A more accurate proxy for that cost is the interest expenses on deposits
reported by each bank, but as we noted earlier this variable is missing in the Call Reports for
35% of the observations in our sample.
Nonetheless, we used this variable to create two alternative proxies for the cost of
deposit funding. In one case we complemented the interest expenses on deposits reported
by banks with our proxy for the cost of deposits, DEPOSIT COST. In the other case,
we complemented that variable with total interest expense reported by banks in the Call
22Reports.25 The results of these two tests are reported in models 2 and 3 of Table 5. Model 1 of
that table repeats our original results to facilitate the comparison with the robustness tests we
report in this section. As we can see from models 2 and 3, neither of the new proxies for the
cost of deposit funding enters the regression with a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. More
importantly, our key ﬁndings remain unchanged when we control for these alternative proxies
for the cost of deposit funding.
5.1.2 Controlling for overall economic conditions
Thus far we have attributed the change in banks’ loan pricing policies when the spreads in
the bond market go up to changes in the cost to banks’ accessing the bond market. Could
that change in banks’ loan pricing policies instead be driven by another factor that we do not
account for in our loan pricing model, such as an overall increase in the “price” of risk?
In the previous robustness test we already ruled out a key alternative driver for our
ﬁndings – the cost of deposit funding. Another set of possible drivers are overall conditions
in the economy. Since in good times bond spreads tend to be lower and bank borrowers tend
to be in better ﬁnancial condition, the overall state of the economy could potentially explain
our ﬁnding that banks increase spreads on their corporate loans when the yield spread in the
bond market goes up and reduce their loan spreads when bond spreads goes down. According
to this alternative hypothesis, it is not clear though why banks that rely exclusively on deposit
funding would adjust their loan pricing policies by less than banks that rely on bond ﬁnancing.
Nonetheless, we undertake three robustness tests to further reduce concerns with this potential
explanation to our ﬁndings. In the ﬁrst test we control for the GDP growth rate to account
for the overall state of the economy. In the second test we control for the slope of the Treasury
yield curve for potential changes in the overall risk premium. Finally, in the third test we
control for the level of the base interest rate used in loan spreads — LIBOR. To be more
speciﬁc, since we are using the log of loan spreads, in the last test we control for the log of the
LIBOR.26
The results of these tests are reported in models 4, 5 and 6, respectively. All of new
controls come out with expected signs and are statistically signiﬁcant with the exception of
25To assure smooth pasting of our proxy into missing observations, we ﬁrst regressed interest expenses on
deposits for the observations we had on other proxies and then we constructed out-of-sample linear predictions
based on these regressions.
26We obtain similar results when we use control for the level of LIBOR, instead. We do not use the log
of the Treasury yield curve because the yield spread is negative (the yield curve is inverted) for some of the
observations in our sample. When we exclude these observations and use the log of the yield spread we obtain
similar results.
23the growth rate of GDP. Adding these controls does not aﬀect our key ﬁndings. In other
words, even when we control for the state of the economy we continue to ﬁnd that banks
increase spreads on their loans to corporations when the cost to access the bond market goes
up. Further, and importantly, we continue to ﬁnd that on those occasions, banks that rely on
bond ﬁnancing increase the interest rates on their corporate loans by more than banks that
rely exclusively on deposit funding.
5.1.3 Controlling for banks’ use of bond ﬁnancing
Our investigation into the way banks adjust their loan pricing policies in response to shocks to
the bond market distinguishes banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding from banks that
use bond ﬁnancing in addition to deposit funding, but it does not account for the relative use
of bond ﬁnancing by the latter banks. Our ﬁnding that bond ﬁnancing banks increase their
loan spreads by more than deposit funding banks when spreads in the bond market go up
suggests that the more banks rely on bond ﬁnancing, the larger the premium they will apply
to their borrowers when the cost of bond ﬁnancing goes up.
To investigate this possibility we replaced in our model of loan spreads the dummy
variable SUBDEBT, which identiﬁes those banks that have bond ﬁnancing, with the variable
SUBASSETS, which measures the portion of the bank’s assets that is funded with bonds.
In addition, we replaced the interaction SUBDEBT x LBBBSPD with SUBASSETS x
LBBBSPD. The results of these tests, which are reported in model 7, continue to show that
the coeﬃcient on LBBBSPD is positive and signiﬁcant. They also show that the coeﬃcient on
SUBASSETS is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that the more bond ﬁnancing banks use,
the lower the interest rates they charge their borrowers. Consistent with our priors the new
results also show that the coeﬃcient on SUBASSETS x LBBBSPD is positive, indicating
when the spreads in the bond market go up, the more bond ﬁnancing the bank uses the
higher the interest premium it imposes on its borrowers as a result. However, the eﬀect of this
interaction term is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Since we found in the previous section that safe borrowers that have access to the bond
market are the least exposed to the interest rate premium banks impose on their borrowers
when bond spreads go up and since bond ﬁnancing banks lend to a higher proportion of
these borrowers, this could explain why that interaction term does not enter the regression
signiﬁcantly. To investigate this possibility, we reestimated the loan spread model 7 after we
dropped all borrowers rated investment grade. The new results, which are reported in model
8, support our expectations: when the cost to access the bond market goes up, bond ﬁnancing
banks increase their loan spreads by more than do deposit funding banks and the diﬀerence
in the interest premium imposed by these banks increases with the amount of bond ﬁnancing
24used by the former banks.
5.1.4 Controlling for endogeneity of banks’ access to debt markets
Until now, we have been taking a bank’s use of bond ﬁnancing as exogenous. In reality, such
access will likely depend on bank characteristics, making it endogenous.27 To correct for this,
we follow the two-step procedure of Faulkender and Petersen (2006): ﬁrst, we conduct a probit
analysis of the determinants of banks’ bond market access, including several instruments that
are not part of our bank controls, then we use the predicted value of bond market access in a
second-stage regression that is analogous to our benchmark model.
The instruments we use are indicators for the bank’s visibility. The idea being that the
more visible the bank is to potential investors the more likely it is it will used bond ﬁnancing
in addition to deposit funding. One of the variables indicates whether the bank’s stock is
listed in the stock market. Banks that are listed are likely to have a bigger visibility in the
ﬁnancial community, making it less costly to issue bonds to the investing public. For similar
reasons, we include a dummy variable that equals one if the bank’s bond issues exceed the
minimum amount required to be in Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond Index (LEHMAN).
Bond investors and analysts are more likely to follow these bonds. As a result, they will have
more information about the issuers of these bonds. Although both of these variables tend to
correlate with size, note that size itself is included as a separate regressor. Our goal is to try
to pick up eﬀects that are incremental to bank size, that is, for a given size, does stock listing
favor bond market access?
We estimated in the ﬁrst stage a Tobit regression of the ratio of subordinated debt
to assets and used predicted values to construct a new dummy variable indicating whether
predicted subordinated debt is positive. Our instruments are jointly signiﬁcant with the P-
value of 0.04. We report the second-stage results of this procedure in model 9. Again, our two
key ﬁndings on deposit funding and bond ﬁnancing banks’ responses to shocks to the cost of
accessing the bond market remain unchanged.
5.1.5 Clustering simultaneously by ﬁrm and by bank
Throughout the paper standard errors are clustered by ﬁrm. Since banks extend multiple loans
each year this could lead the error term in our regression to be correlated across loans not just
for a given ﬁrm, but also for a given bank. To address this issue, we follow Petersen (2006)
and rerun our core regressions with clustering by bank as well as by ﬁrm. The results of this
27Faulkender and Petersen (2006), for example, document that nonﬁnancial ﬁrms’ access to the bond market
is endogenous.
25test, which are reported in model 10 of Table 5, show only a negligible increase in the standard
errors, suggesting that clustering by ﬁrm only is, in fact, appropriate.
5.1.6 Controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
Another potential concern with the results we presented thus far is whether they could be
driven by sample selection. To the extent that there are diﬀerences between the cohorts of
borrowers that take out loans from the two groups of banks and these are observable, we likely
account for them through our set of ﬁrm controls. That said, there is always a possibility
of some unobservable diﬀerences. This could explain, for instance, why bond funding banks
charge lower spreads on their loans than banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding. It is
unlikely to explain why banks increase their loan interest rates when the cost to raise funding
in the bond market goes up. It is even less likely to explain why on those occasions deposit
funding banks increase their loan interest rates by less than bond funding banks. Nonetheless,
to further reduce concerns that sample selection drives our key ﬁndings, we re-estimate our
loan pricing model with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The results of this test are reported in model 11
of Table 5. Since our key ﬁndings remain unchanged when identiﬁed solely by within-ﬁrm
variation in loan spreads, it is unlikely that sample selection drives our results.
5.2 Do banks pass bond market shocks to all borrowers? Robustness tests
We undertook a set of robustness tests similar to those we report in the previous subsection to
investigate the robustness of our ﬁndings on the diﬀerential response of banks vis-` a-vis their
bank-dependent borrowers and non-bank-dependent borrowers. All tests build on models 7
and 8 of Table 4, which diﬀerentiate between borrowers that do and that do not have access to
the bond market, depending on whether they have issued in that market recently, and further
distinguish among borrowers that are rated investment grade and those that are rated below
investment grade. To facilitate the comparisons we report these models again in the ﬁrst two
columns of Table 6. As with our previous tests, in the interest of space, we report only the
coeﬃcients relevant for each test as well as the coeﬃcients that show how banks adjusted their
loan pricing policies to their bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent borrowers.
Models 3 though 6 investigate the robustness of our ﬁndings when we consider our two
alternative measures of banks’ cost of deposit fundingDEPOSITCOST1 and DEPOSITCOST2,
respectively. Models 7 though 12, in turn, attempt to account for macroeconomic conditions
by controlling for the GDP growth rate, the slope of the Treasury yield curve, and the log
of LIBOR.28 Models 13 and 14 show the results of the second-stage approach we consider to
28As with the robustness tests we reported in the previous subsection, we get similar results when we use the
26investigate the eﬀects of the potential endogeneity of ﬁrms’ access to the bond market. As
before, we follow the two-step procedure of Faulkender and Petersen (2006): ﬁrst, we conduct a
probit analysis of the determinants of ﬁrms’ bond market access, including several instruments
that are not part of our ﬁrm controls, then we use the predicted value of bond market access in
a second-stage regression that is analogous to model we use in the other robustness tests. The
dependent variable of the ﬁrst stage is our dummy variable which indicates if the ﬁrm issued
in the public bond market at least once in the last ﬁve years. Our instruments are intended
to identify ﬁrms that are more visible to bond investors. The instruments we use are whether
a ﬁrm is included in the S&P 500, whether a ﬁrm’s shares trade on the NYSE, and whether
a ﬁrm’s outstanding bond issues are large enough to merit inclusion in Lehmann’s Corporate
Bond Index. As discussed in Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Santos and Winton (2008),
these variables correlate with public debt market access but have an impact over and above
that induced by our other ﬁrm controls.29 Finally, models 15 and 16 investigate the robustness
of our ﬁndings when we cluster simultaneously by ﬁrm and by bank, and models 17 and 18
investigate what happens to our ﬁndings when we estimate our loan pricing models for the
deposit and bond ﬁnancing banks with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
Since we discussed in detail each of these tests in the previous subsection, in the interest
of space here we only discuss the robustness of our ﬁndings regarding the extent to which banks
pass bond market shocks to their dependent and non-dependent borrowers. The results of the
robustness tests conﬁrm the three ﬁndings we reported in Section 4. First, both deposit and
bond funding banks increase their loan spreads when the cost to access the bond market goes
up, but this increase is less pronounced among banks that rely exclusively on deposit funding.
Second, deposit funding banks appear to apply the same interest premium to all of
their borrowers, regardless of whether they have access to the bond market. Our results show
that these banks apply diﬀerent premiums to their borrowers in only two instances. When we
investigate the eﬀect of the potential endogeneity of ﬁrm access to the bond market, we ﬁnd
evidence that deposit funding banks apply a smaller premium to their safe borrowers that have
access to the bond market (model 13). However, when we consider ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects we ﬁnd
that these banks apply a larger premium to these same borrowers.30
Third, bond funding banks apply the largest interest premium to risky borrowers that
have access to the bond market. Bank dependent borrowers come next and safe borrowers
level of the Treasury yield curve and the level of LIBOR or the log of these variables.
29Our instruments are jointly signiﬁcant at less than 1% level.
30It must be noted that only 350 loans in our sample were given by deposit funding banks to borrowers with
the access to the bond market and only 157 of those to safe borrowers. Thus, these particular results could be
driven by inﬂuential observations.
27with access to the bond market are the least penalized, though, the diﬀerence in their inter-
est premium and that of bank dependent borrowers is sometimes not statistically signiﬁcant.
Again, in only one test we ﬁnd a slight diﬀerence to these results. When we account for the
potential endogeneity of ﬁrma access to the bond market, we ﬁnd that even safe ﬁrms with
access to the bond market pay a higher interest premium than banks dependent borrowers,
but not as high as risky borrower with access to the bond market (model 14).
In sum, our robustness tests by and large conﬁrm our earlier ﬁndings that banks,
particularly those that rely on bond ﬁnancing, pass bond market shocks predominantly to their
risky borrowers that have access to the bond market, possibly because these borrowers are shut
out of this market, becoming bank dependent on those occasions, and to their borrowers that
do not have access to the bond market and therefore are likely to depend on banks for external
funding. Safe borrowers that have access to the bond market are also exposed to these shocks
via banks, though, they tend to pay the lower interest rate premium as a result.
5.3 Do banks issue bonds during crises periods?
The results we reported thus far presume that when the spreads on the bond market go up
this increases the cost of funding for banks that have bond funding in their capital structure.
Since bonds are usually priced as ﬁxed-rate securities, that link implicitly assumes that these
banks issue in the bond market regularly or at least with a frequency that makes them likely to
issue even in periods when the spreads in the bond market have gone up. Indeed many banks,
in particular the larger ones, have bond issuance programs whereby they issue bonds regularly
not only because of their funding needs but also to maintain a constant presence in the market
and beneﬁt from the bank’s visibility in the bond investor community. For example, over the
period 2000–2007, ﬁve of the largest banks in the country, Citigroup, Bank of America, JP
Morgan, Wells Fargo and Vachovia, issued on average 13, 44, 32, 11 and 7 bonds each year,
respectively.
Of course if banks, including those that have such bond issuance programs, are able
to time their funding needs and avoid issuing bonds when the conditions in the bond market
are not favorable, this will weaken the link that we ﬁnd between spreads in the bond market
and banks’ cost of funding. Thus, such programs will bias us against ﬁnding our results.
Nonetheless, to further reduce concerns with this issue we investigated if banks still issue in
the bond market when spreads in this market are elevated and if these banks adjusted their
loan pricing policies as a result.
To that end, we started by identifying the “crises” in the bond market during the sample
period. We deﬁned these crises as extended periods of time where the ex ante triple-B over
triple-A yield spread was above one. This criteria left us with ﬁve bond market crises during
28the sample period (1987–2007).31 Next, we identiﬁed which of the banks issued bonds during
these crises. After that, we isolated those borrowers that took out loans during these crises or
in the time period immediately after the crisis. We considered two alternative deﬁnitions to
identify these periods of time: one year and three years. Lastly, we investigated whether the
loans that were taken out during these periods of time from banks that issued bonds during
the corresponding crisis carried higher spreads.
The results of this test are reported in Table 7, where control variables are omitted
in the interest of space. Our variables of interest are BKBONDCRISIS, a dummy variable
that is equal to one if the bank issued the last bond prior to each loan during the period of
high triple-B spread, LOANCRISIS, a dummy variable that is equal to one if the loan itself
was extended during the period of tight bond market conditions, and the interaction of these
two variables.
Table 7 follows a structure similar to Table 3 with an additional model to consider ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects. Panels A and B report separate sets of regressions for one-year and three-year
windows, respectively. Model 1 investigates whether banks that issued bonds in the period
where the spreads in the bond market were elevated charged higher rates on the loans they
extended during and after that time, controlling for our set of ﬁrm controls. Models 2 and 3
add our sets of loan and bond controls, respectively. Model 4 further expands our controls to
account for the cost of deposit funding of banks. Finally, model 5 includes ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
in addition to the set of controls in model 4, to make sure that our results are not driven by
diﬀerences across bank borrowers.
The results of this test conﬁrm our earlier ﬁndings. In all the models, regardless of the
time period included, banks that issued during the periods of tight bond market conditions
charged higher interest rates on their subsequent loans compared to banks that issued their
last bond before the loan during a tranquil period, which could be the same bank during a
diﬀerent period of time.32 Not surprisingly, we also ﬁnd that loans extended during tight bond
market conditions carry higher interest rates, even when we control for the cost of deposits
in models 4 and 5. The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms are not statistically signiﬁcant,
indicating that banks that issued bonds during the crisis periods continued charging higher
interest rates on loans extended within one or three years after the crisis was over. This is
consistent with banks passing the cost of their funding onto borrowers, considering that bonds
31The dates of these “crises” are as follows: Aug. 15, 90 through Mar. 4, 92; Sept. 30, 98 through Dec. 9, 99;
Apr. 11, 00 through Nov. 24, 03; May 2, 05 through May 30, 05 and Nov 7, 07 through end of sample period
Dec. 31, 07).
32To keep this comparison clean, we excluded from these regressions all loans issued by banks that did not
access bond market prior to loans.
29tend to be ﬁxed-rate and have an average maturity of ﬁve years.
In this section, therefore, we provide direct evidence of the mechanism that we believe
is behind our main ﬁndings — by separately estimating the eﬀects of bond market conditions
during the time when the loan is extended and during the time when the bond funding bank
issued a corresponding bond, we are able to conclude that bond funding banks, indeed, pass
the cost of their bond ﬁnancing onto borrowers.
6 Final remarks
Our result that banks’ use of bond ﬁnancing creates a link between their loan pricing policy
and the conditions in the bond market is novel. This result also has some important impli-
cations. For instance, it shows that as banks increasingly rely on bond ﬁnancing, ﬁnancial
intermediation that is performed through banks will become increasingly interlinked with the
intermediation performed through ﬁnancial markets. As a consequence, corporate borrowers,
including those that rely exclusively on banks for external funding, will become increasingly
exposed to the conditions in the bond market. In addition, banks will ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to
smooth interest rates on their loans over the business cycle.
That result suggests several potential ideas for fruitful research. Researchers, for in-
stance, have pointed out that an important advantage of bank funding is banks’ ability to
“smooth” interest rates on their loans to relationship borrowers over the business cycle.33 It
would be interesting to ascertain whether banks are still capable of smoothing the interest
rates to their relationship borrowers when they themselves rely on bond ﬁnancing. Similarly,
a common view in the ﬁnancial architecture literature is that banks and debt markets operate
independently from each other.34 Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Allen and Gale (2000), and
Song and Thakor (2009) develop models in which banks and ﬁnancial markets complement each
other, but none of them consider the complementarity that we identify in this paper. Since
banks rely increasingly on market funding, including bond ﬁnancing and commercial paper
funding, it would be interesting to investigate the eﬀects of the roles of ﬁnancial intermediaries
and markets when the former also rely on ﬁnancial markets to raise funding.
33See Berlin, and Mester (1999) for a theory of bank interest rate smoothing and some supporting evidence.
34See Allen and Gale (1997, 1999), Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and
Boot and Thakor (1997).
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33Table 1. Sample characterization
a
Variables Banks with Banks without Diﬀerence p-value
bond ﬁnancing bond ﬁnancing
Diﬀerences among banks
ASSETS 437.6 8.43 429.1 0.000
ROA 0.128 0.137 -0.009 0.001
ROAVOL 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.000
CHARGEOFFS 0.108 0.106 0.001 0.724
LIQUIDITY 20.130 29.525 -9.395 0.000
DEPOSIT 31.631 56.390 -24.759 0.000
DEPOSIT COST 1.409 3.059 -1.650 0.000
INT EXPENSE 0.117 0.297 -0.180 0.000
CAPITAL 7.45 8.26 -0.81 0.000
Diﬀerences in the loan policies
LOANSPD 162.4 234.0 -71.5 0.000
AMOUNT 407.5 85.1 322.4 0.000
MATURITY 4.007 3.523 0.484 0.016
SECURED 0.433 0.658 -0.225 0.000
SENIOR 0.963 0.902 0.061 0.000
DIVIDEND REST 0.460 0.373 0.087 0.000
CORP PURPOSES 0.297 0.292 0.005 0.640
REFINANCE 0.613 0.370 0.242 0.000
WORK CAPITAL 0.183 0.205 -0.021 0.029
TERM LOAN 0.387 0.357 0.030 0.010
CREDIT LINE 0.580 0.585 -0.005 0.672
RELATIONSHIP 0.622 0.514 0.108 0.000
Diﬀerences among borrowers
AGE 22.8 13.5 9.26 0.000
SALES 6376.9 1375.0 5001.9 0.000
PROF MARGIN -0.011 -0.076 0.065 0.032
INT COV 26.013 29.903 -3.890 0.698
EARNINGS VOL 44.260 6.732 37.528 0.000
LEVERAGE 0.317 0.305 0.012 0.033
TANGIBLES 0.730 0.751 -0.021 0.049
ADVERTISING 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.003
RD 0.027 0.064 -0.037 0.039
NWC 8.019 3.457 4.562 0.000
MKTOBOOK 1.785 1.701 0.084 0.009
RATING 0.538 0.229 0.309 0.000
RATINGIG 0.325 0.056 0.269 0.000
RATINGBG 0.213 0.173 0.040 0.000
PBOND 0.575 0.277 0.298 0.000
PBONDIG 0.254 0.035 0.220 0.000
PBONDBG 0.190 0.148 0.042 0.000
a ASSETS Bank assets in 100 million dollars. ROA returns on assets (net income divided by assets); ROAVOL
Standard deviation of the quarterly ROA computed over the last three years. CHARGEOFFS net charge oﬀs
over assets; LIQUIDITY Cash plus securities over assets. DEPOSIT deposits over assets; DEPOSIT COST
34product between the ratio of deposits over assets and the three month LIBOR; INT EXPENSE interest
expenses on deposits alone (over deposits). Numbers reported are for only 13009 of the 19930 observations in
the sample because it is missing for the remaining banks; CAPITAL equity capital over assets; LOANSPD
all-in-drawn loan spread over LIBOR at origination; AMOUNT Loan amount; MATURITY Loan maturity in
years; SECURED Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is secured; SENIOR Dummy variable equal to 1 if
the loan is senior; DIV IDEND REST Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower faces dividend restrictions
in connection with the loan; CORP PURPOSES Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is corporate purposes;
REFINANCE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is to reﬁnance existing debt; WORK CAPITALDummy
variable equal to 1 if the loans is for working capital; TERM LOAN Dummy variable equal to 1 if it is a term
loan; CREDIT LINE Dummy variable equal to 1 if it is a credit lien; AGE Age of the borrower in years;
SALES Sales in millions of dollars; PROF MARGIN Net income over sales; INT COV the interest coverage
(EBITDA divided by interest expense). EARNINGS V OL earnings volatility (the standard deviation of
the ﬁrm’s quarterly return on assets over the last three years); LEV ERAGE leverage ratio (debt over total
assets); TANGIBLES tangible assets (inventories plus plant, property, and equipment over total assets);
ADVERTISING expenses with advertising scaled by the ﬁrm’s sales; R&D expenses with R&D scaled by the
ﬁrm’s sales; NWC Net working capital. MKTOBOOK market to book value. RATING Dummy variable
equal to 1 if the borrower has a credit rating; RATINGIG Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has
an investment grade rating; RATINGBG Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has a below investment
grade rating; PBOND Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower issued a public bond in the last ﬁve years
prior to the loan; PBONDIG Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower issued a public bond which was rated
investment grade in the last ﬁve years prior to the loan; PBONDBG Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower
issued a public bond which was rated below investment grade in the last ﬁve years prior to the loan;
35Table 2. Diﬀerences between loan spreads of banks with and without bond ﬁnancing
a
Diﬀerences as the conditions in the bond market change
Bond market condtions Banks with Banks without Diﬀerence p-value
bond ﬁnancing bond ﬁnancing
High BBB spd 180.5 267.7 -87.2 0.000
Low BBB spd 142.7 214.6 -71.8 0.000
Diﬀerence 37.8 53.1
p-value 0.000 0.000
Diﬀerences for bank dependent and non bank dependent borrowers as the conditions in the bond market change
Borrower Bond mkt Banks with Banks without Diﬀerence p-value
conditions bond ﬁnancing bond ﬁnancing
High BBB spd 146.5 232.2 -85.7 0.000
Not bk dep
Low BBB spd 102.5 189.8 -87.3 0.000
Diﬀerence 44.0 42.4
p-value 0.000 0.050
High BBB spd 228.1 276.8 -48.7 0.00
Bk dep
Low BBB spd 177.0 222.4 -45.4 0.00
Diﬀerence 51.1 54.5
p-value 0.000 0.000
a The loan spread is the all-in-drawn loan spread over LIBOR at origination. Banks have bond ﬁnancing if
they have subdebt in their balance sheet at the time of the loan. Borrowers are deﬁned to be bank dependent
if they do not have a credit rating at the time of the loan. High (low) BBB is the top (bottom) quartile of the
diﬀerence between the Moody’s indexes on the ex ante yields of triple-B and triple-A rated bonds.
36Table 3. Shocks to bond markets and bank loan pricing policies.
a
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SUBDEBT -0.138*** -0.104*** -0.0421 -0.0650 -0.0652
(0.0345) (0.0400) (0.0281) (0.0444) (0.0450)
LBBBSPD 0.102*** 0.158*** 0.133*** 0.133***
(0.0331) (0.0289) (0.0305) (0.0307)
SUBDEBT x LBBBSPD 0.173*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.133***
(0.0425) (0.0365) (0.0370) (0.0371)
LAGE -0.111*** -0.119*** -0.0876*** -0.0881*** -0.0881***
(0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0153) (0.0149) (0.0150)
LSALES -0.234*** -0.235*** -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.107***
(0.00696) (0.00690) (0.00860) (0.00913) (0.00911)
LEVERAGE 0.435*** 0.433*** 0.354*** 0.353*** 0.353***
(0.0501) (0.0491) (0.0460) (0.0457) (0.0457)
TANGIBLES -0.0670*** -0.0678*** -0.0326 -0.0314 -0.0314
(0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0205)
ROAVOL 0.119*** 0.111*** 0.0992*** 0.0965*** 0.0965***
(0.0390) (0.0387) (0.0306) (0.0296) (0.0295)
RD -0.148*** -0.147*** -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.105***
(0.0428) (0.0406) (0.0317) (0.0316) (0.0316)
ADVERTISING -0.650** -0.650** -0.591** -0.608** -0.608**
(0.273) (0.264) (0.240) (0.244) (0.243)
LINTCOV -0.183*** -0.176*** -0.140*** -0.139*** -0.139***
(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0179)
MKTBOOK -0.0421* -0.0428* -0.0351* -0.0352* -0.0352*
(0.0236) (0.0232) (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0189)
PROF MARGIN -0.0151 -0.0144 -0.0208 -0.0210 -0.0210
(0.0215) (0.0204) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0143)
NWC 0.0325 0.0267 0.0232 0.0225 0.0225
(0.0464) (0.0439) (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0443)
RELATIONSHIP -0.0610** -0.0571** -0.0210 -0.0197 -0.0198
(0.0303) (0.0285) (0.0256) (0.0245) (0.0243)
TREND 0.0293*** 0.0253*** 0.0204*** 0.0248*** 0.0248***
(0.00341) (0.00346) (0.00483) (0.00414) (0.00417)
LAMOUNT -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.106***
(0.00556) (0.00536) (0.00532)
LMATURITY 0.0757*** 0.0741*** 0.0741***
(0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0194)
SECURED 0.536*** 0.534*** 0.534***
(0.0355) (0.0346) (0.0346)
CORP PURPOSES -0.0242 -0.0266 -0.0266
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204)
REFINANCE -0.0707*** -0.0714*** -0.0714***
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0138)
WORK CAPITAL -0.0521*** -0.0533** -0.0533**
(0.0193) (0.0207) (0.0207)
TERM LOAN -0.341*** -0.338*** -0.338***
(0.0616) (0.0616) (0.0606)
Continues on the next page.
37Table 3 (Continued).
a
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CREDIT LINE -0.409*** -0.405*** -0.405***
(0.0708) (0.0709) (0.0700)
DIVIDEND REST 0.119*** 0.125*** 0.125***
(0.0293) (0.0283) (0.0287)
















Observations 19930 19930 19930 19930 19930
R
2Adjusted 0.462 0.480 0.586 0.587 0.587
a Dependent variable is LLOANSPD is the natural log of the all-in-drawn loan spread over LIBOR at origi-
nation; SUBDEBT Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for loans extended by banks with subdebt in their
balance sheet at the time of the loan; LBBBSPD Natural log of the diﬀerence between the Moody’s indexes on
the ex ante yields of triple-B and triple-A rated bonds; See deﬁnitions of remaining controls in Table 1. Robust


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42Table 7. Loan policies of banks that issue during bond market crises.
a
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Loans taken out during a crisis in bond market or one year after the crisis
BK BOND CRISIS 0.0761* 0.0789** 0.0889*** 0.0695** 0.0700**
(0.0413) (0.0310) (0.0323) (0.0338) (0.0307)
LOAN CRISIS 0.0920 0.102** 0.119*** 0.130*** 0.127***
(0.0593) (0.0428) (0.0390) (0.0379) (0.0413)
BK BOND CRISIS x LOAN CRISIS -0.0740 -0.0559 -0.0871 -0.0840 -0.0643
(0.0753) (0.0583) (0.0568) (0.0572) (0.0488)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀects NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 10468 10468 10468 10468 10468
R
2Adjusted 0.492 0.599 0.601 0.603 0.233
Panel B: Loans taken out during a crisis in bond market or three years after the crisis
BK BOND CRISIS 0.101*** 0.0782** 0.0803** 0.0655* 0.0778***
(0.0361) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0343) (0.0262)
LOAN CRISIS 0.137** 0.113*** 0.122*** 0.134*** 0.140***
(0.0568) (0.0401) (0.0361) (0.0339) (0.0366)
BK BOND CRISIS x LOAN CRISIS -0.0965 -0.0495 -0.0773 -0.0747 -0.0693
(0.0692) (0.0561) (0.0552) (0.0545) (0.0433)
Firm ﬁxed eﬀects NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 14029 14029 14029 14029 14029
R
2Adjusted 0.478 0.586 0.588 0.590 0.246
a Dependent variable is LLOANSPD is the natural log of the all-in-drawn loan spread over LIBOR at origina-
tion; BKBONDCRISIS Dummy variable equal to one if the bank issued a bond during the crisis in the bond
market. LOAN CRISIS Dummy variable equal to one if the loan was taken out during the crisis in the bond
market. Crises in the bond market correspond to periods of time when BBBSPD was above or close to 1 for an
extended period of time. These periods are Aug. 15, 1990 through Mar. 4, 1992; Sept. 30, 1998 through Dec.
9, 1999; Apr. 11, 2000 through Nov. 24, 2003; May 2, 2005 through May 30, 2005 and Nov 7, 2007 through end
of sample period Dec. 31, 2007. Included, but not reported, are the same controls as in corresponding columns
of Table 3. Robust standard errors clustered on company in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at
5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
43